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to delineate the scope of and grounds for civil liability under rule
15cl-7.
CHARLES E. ELROD, JR.
Taxation-Charitable Deductions-Bequest for Benefit of Employees
The majority shareholder of a corporation made a bequest of
forty per cent of his residuary estate to a testamentary trust to pro-
vide pension payments-to the employees of the corporation. Em-
ployees employed prior to, or at the time of, decedent's death who
retired after twenty-five years of service were to receive monthly
pension payments of not more than 125 dollars.' Yearly trust in-
come in excess of that needed for pension payments was to be paid
over to an employees' trust fund created by the corporation in 1946
for pension purposes. Upon the death of the last surviving em-
ployee-beneficiary, the trustees of the testamentary trust were to
terminate it by paying 2,000 dollars to each of three named hospitals
and the remainder of the income and corpus to the employees' trust
fund. If the employees' trust fund was not in existence, the income
and corpus was to be divided equally among the three hospitals.
After the Commissioner of Internal Revenue refused to allow
the decedent's bequest to the trust as a charitable deduction, the
decedent's estate paid the asserted estate tax deficiency and sued in
a federal district court for a refund. The district court,' relying on
an earlier Third Circuit decision,' held that the bequest was chari-
table and qualified for a deduction under section 812(d) of the
1939 Internal Revenue Code (the predecessor of section 2055 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954). The court found that suffi-
cient public benefit flowed from the trusts to make them charitable,
the beneficiaries of the trusts were ascertainable, and the discretion
vested in the trustees was limited to disbursements for charitable
purposes. On appeal, in Watson v. United States4 a divided Third
Circuit reversed and held that the testamentary trust was not chari-
table. The majority of the court found that the trust benefited the
'The exact amount was to be determined by subtracting from $125 the
amount of Social Security benefits and corporate pension payments received
by an employee. Corporate officers and directors were not to receive pension
payments.
'Watson v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 90, 379 (D.N.J. 1963).
' Gimbel v. Comm'r, 54 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1931).
' 355 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1965).
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corporation as well as the employees, represented compensation to
the employees, and was an ordinary pension trust which Congress
distinguished from charitable organizations by sections 401(a),
501(a) and 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The court prefaced its reasoning with the statement, "We are not
here dealing with an impoverished class."' The court also held that
a New Jersey Superior Court's holding that the testamentary trust
was charitable" was not binding in a federal tax determination.
A concurring opinion underscored the majority's holding that
local definitions of charity are not binding in federal tax determina-
tions. A dissenting judge, taking an opposite view of the effect of
local law, expressed the opinion that the finding of the New Jersey
Superior Court was binding and precluded independent considera-
tion of the issue in the tax case. Another dissenting judge would
have affirmed on the reasoning and findings of the district court.
Prior to the Watson decision, it was generally believed that gifts
and bequests for the benefit of employees could result in charitable
deductions under the federal income and estate taxes. A long line
of cases had held that gifts providing retirement or welfare benefits
to employees were in the public interest and should be encouraged.7
The majority in Watson refused to follow these precedents and
indicated that such gifts and bequests are no longer charitable in the
Third Circuit.
In applying section 812(d) the Watson court divided on two
points: the effect of local law and the characterization of employee
pension trusts.
rId. at 271.
'Passaic-Clifton Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Essex
County C458-55, April 22, 1957. The court held that both the testamentary
and the employees' trusts were charitable and therefore not subject to the
New Jersey Rule Against Perpetuities. In an unrelated action, Watson v.
Brower, 24 N.J. 210, 131 A.2d 512 (1957), the New Jersey Supreme Court,
in ruling on the use of the word "retire" in the testamentary trust, noted
that the trust was intended to benefit the corporation as well as the employ-
ees.7 eHarrison v. Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1937); Gimbel
v. Comm'r, 54 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1931); Eagan v. Comm'r, 43
F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1930); Mutual Aid & Benefit Ass'n v. Comm'r, 42
F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1930); Estate of Leonard 0. Carlson, 21 T.C. 291 (1953);
T.J. Moss Tie Co., 18 T.C. 188 (1952), petition to review docketed and dis-
mnissed on notion of petitioner and consent of respondent, 201 F.2d 512 (8th
Cir. 1953); Estate of Lillian D. Wald, 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 855 (1944);
Estate of Carolyn E. Gray, 2 T.C. 97 (1943); Proctor Patterson, 34 B.T.A.
689 (1936); John R. Sibley, 16 B.T.A. 915 (1929).
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I. EFFECT OF LOCAL LAW
The role of local law in federal tax litigation has been kept at
a minimum in an endeavor to achieve nationwide uniformity in
federal taxation. The Supreme Court set forth the guidelines in
Burnet v. Harmel' when it declared that the Internal Revenue Code
should "be interpreted so as to give a uniform application to a
nationwide scheme of taxation. ' Following this idea, the Court in
Lyeth v. Hoey'0 held that property that an heir received under a will
compromise was acquired by "inheritance," as that term is used in
the income tax, and was therefore exempt from the income tax de-
spite the fact that under the local state law the heir acquired the
property by a contract with the legatee named in the decedent's will.
The Court said:
Congress establishes its own criteria and the state law may con-
trol only when the federal taxing act by express language or
necessary implication makes its operation dependent upon state
law .... There is no such expression or necessary implication
in this instance. Whether what an heir receives from the estate
of his ancestor through the compromise of his contest of his
ancestor's will should be regarded as within the exemption from
the federal tax should not be decided in one way in the case of
an heir in Pennsylvania or Minnesota and in another way in the
case of an heir in Massachusetts or New York, according to the
differing views of the state courts. We think that it was the in-
tention of Congress in establishing this exemption to provide a
uniform rule."
Although the federal estate tax exempts gifts to charity, it does
not define "charitable."' 12 It would be possible to determine whether
a bequest was charitable by recourse to the state law governing the
bequest, but this would mean that a bequest by a decedent domiciled
in one state might be charitable and deductible for purposes of the
federal estate tax, while an identical bequest by a decedent domiciled
in another state would not be charitable and deductible. In other
words, this would lead to the lack of uniformity that the Supreme
-287 U.S. 103 (1932).
Old. at 110.
10305 U.S. 188 (1938).
Id. at 194.
LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIrT TAxEs 352 (2d ed.
1962); 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFrT AND ESTATE TAXATION 345
(1959).
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Court sought to avoid in Lyeth v. Hoey. The majority of the court
in the Watson case may have acted properly in refusing to be bound
by state decisions holding the trust charitable. The term "chari-
table" in a federal tax statute may like "inheritance" in the federal
income tax be a term that should be defined by a uniform federal
definition. It seems apparent, however, that if the federal courts
are not going to be bound by the law of a particular state in defining
the term "charitable," they should not eschew the common law
entirely. There are basic common-law conceptions about what are
charitable purposes that might well be used as the foundation for
a uniform federal tax definition of charitable. If the majority in
the Watson case derived its decisions from any such general princi-
ples, it failed to articulate clearly either the principles or the nexus
between them and its conclusion.
II. EMPLOYEE TRUSTS
The Watson decision rests primarily upon a finding that Con-
gress did not intend for employee pension trusts to be charitable
organizations within the meaning of the Code. Apparently the court
reasoned that Congress by expressly providing for the tax treat-
ment of pension trusts in sections 401(a) and 501 (a) excluded em-
ployees' pension trusts from charitable organizations under section
501(c) (3). This finding was based in part on Revenue Ruling
56-138,"8 which the majority found to be on all fours with the facts
in Watson. In that ruling a corporation sought to deduct as chari-
table contributions payments to a trust organized and operated by
the corporation to provide pensions to retired employees and benefits
to certain employees who were to be selected by an executive com-
mittee. The Commissioner ruled that trusts organized primarily for
the purpose of paying pensions to retired employees were not orga-
nized exclusively for charitable purposes within the meaning of sec-
tion 501(c) (3) and were, therefore, not entitled to an income tax
exemption under section 501(a). Section 401(a), as well as
Revenue Ruling 56-138, deals specifically with one type of pension
trusts-pension trusts created and funded by a corporate employer.
If such a trust meets the many requirements of section 401, it re-
ceives favorable tax treatment from other sections of the Code.14
13 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 202.
' Generally, §§ 402 and 403 provide that amounts contributed to quali-
1166 [Vol. 44
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Such trusts are distinguishable from charitable organizations. Sec-
tion 401 is in no way concerned with pension trusts created and
funded by nonemployers. The section has no relevancy to a bequest
in trust for the retirement of employees. It is highly improbable
that Congress intended the section to have any effect whatever on
the tax status of a bequest similar to the one in Watson. Whether
or not a gift to an employees' trust is charitable would appear to
depend upon the circumstances surrounding the gift. Corporate con-
tributions to an employees' trust created by the corporation for the
primary benefit of its officer-stockholders might well be viewed dif-
ferently than a bequest by a disinterested philanthropist to a trust
to provide modest retirement benefits for the impecunious employees
of a depressed industry.
The Watson decision was also grounded on findings that the
beneficiaries of the trust were not impoverished and the bequest was
not charitably motivated. It is doubtful that the Third Circuit in-
tended to limit the recipients of charitable giving to the impover-
ished. It is well established that those of modest means as well as
paupers are proper objects of charitable trusts. 5 Indeed, a means
test is not a necessary ingredient of a charitable trust. Relief of
poverty is but one of several charitable purposes recognized by the
law.16
Apparently the court in Watson felt that the fact that the
decedent had been the majority shareholder of the corporation estab-
lished a lasting employer-employee relationship between him and
the employees that survived his death. On the basis of this relation-
ship the majority found that the bequest was intended to and did
benefit both the employees and the corporation. In attributing
selfish designs to the decedent, the majority overturned the finding
of the district court that he was charitably motivated.
fled pension plans by employers will not be taxed to the employees
until distributed pursuant to the plan. Employers are allowed, within pre-
scribed limits, an immediate deduction from gross income for contributions
to qualified pension plans under § 404.
"Bowditch v. Attorney Gen., 241 Mass. 168, 134 N.E. 796 (1922);
Gibson v. Frye Institute, 137 Tenn. 452, 193 S.W. 1059 (1916);
New England Sanitarium v. Inhabitants of Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335, 91
N.E. 385 (1910); Godfrey v. Hutchins, 28 R.I. 517, 68 Atl. 317 (1907);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 374, comment g (1959); BOGERT,
TRUSTS 145 (4th ed. 1963); 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 374.11 (2d ed. 1956).
" See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 368-74 (1959);
BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 57-64 (4th ed. 1963); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 368-74 (2d
ed. 1956).
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Prior cases consistently had held that organizations dedicated
to the well-being of employees could be charitable for tax purposes. 17
Gifts and bequests for the retirement or welfare of employees were
deemed to be in the public interest and were to be encouraged.18
The courts did not deny charitable deductions because of selfish
motives of the donor, the lack of need of some of the benefited
employees, or the promised benefits inducing employees to work
longer and harder. 9
Scott, Bogert and the Restatement of Trusts indicate that trusts
for the aid and relief of employees can be charitable.2 ' Bogert states
that employee pension trusts can be charitable,21 but comment
37 5 (g) of the Restatement, without citing authority, flatly asserts
that employee pension trusts are not charitable.
Although the weight of authority is stacked against the Watson
decision, much of the authority is a product of the depression years.
Perhaps the tax status of employee pension trusts should be re-
examined in light of existing social and economic conditions. Cer-
tainly with the emergence of Social Security, corporate pension
plans, and other forms of old age assistance such as Medicare, the
reasons for bestowing tax benefits to encourage private assistance
to the elderly are not as obvious as they were thirty years ago. The
court would have been on firmer legal footing if it had based its
decision on the noncharitable aspects of the employees' trust fund.
This trust was to receive unascertainable yearly pour-overs of in-
come from the testamentary trust and the remainder of the corpus
and income of the trust on its termination. The employees' trust
fund was amendable by collective bargaining, made its trustees sub-
ject to the instructions of the board of directors of the corporation
and was funded by the corporation. Indeed, it would appear to be
exactly the type of trust that section 401 (a) would distinguish from
charitable organizations. If this trust was not organized for chari-
table purposes,2 2 an unascertainable amount of the bequest to the
'7 See note 7 supra.
18 See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GirT TAXATION 645-47, 650 (1942).
1 Harrison v. Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1937).
0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 375, comment g (1957); BOGERT,
TRUSTS 166 (4th ed. 1963); 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS 2711 (2d ed. 1956).
21 BOGERT, TRUSTS § 61, at 166 (4th ed. 1963).
"0 The district court found that the employees' trust fund was charitable,
Watson v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 90,379 (D.N.J. 1963), relying
in part on Passaic-Clifton Natl Bank & Trust Co., Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
Essex County C458-55, April 22, 1957, which held that the employees' trust
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testamentary trust was not to be used exclusively for charitable
purposes, and clearly the deduction should not be allowed.
It is doubtful that the Watson case stands for the proposition
that a gift to a trust to provide retirement benefits for employees
cannot be charitable for federal tax purposes. The deductibility of
such gifts appears to depend upon the circumstances surrounding
the gift, such as the persons benefited by the trust, the nature and
extent of their benefits, the relation between the donor and the
beneficiaries of the trust and any possible advantages accruing to
the donor from the gift to the trust.
WILLIAM S. LOWNDES
Torts-Parent-Child Immunity
In First Union Nat'l Bank v. Hackney' the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that a parent's common-law immunity to tort
claims brought by his unemancipated minor children' does not apply
to prevent recovery where a wrongful death action is brought by
the administrator of one parent against the estate of the other
parent, for the benefit of the children.
In Hackney the parents of four minor children were killed when
the family car ran off a highway and hit a tree. The administrator
of the mother's estate brought a wrongful death action against the
estate of the father based on his alleged negligence in losing con-
trol of the vehicle. The defendant asserted (1) that the children
were the real parties in interest as plaintiffs since any recovery in
the action would go to them as sole distributees of their mother;
fund was charitable for purposes of the New Jersey Rule Against Perpetui-
ties.
'266 N.C. 17, 145 S.E.2d 352 (1965).
Parent-child immunity to negligence claims of each other was an inno-
vation of American courts. The first precedent for the rule was Hewlett
v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), where the court reasoned that:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and
a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and
the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear
in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal in-juries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
"Parental authority" and the "security of the home" were two of the
policy reasons which convinced a majority of the North Carolina court to
adopt the parent-child immunity rule in Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577,
118 S.E. 12 (1923).
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